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If  one  wishes  to  understand  the  bulk  processing  of  cases  within  criminal  justice  systems,  plenty  of 
scholarship highlights the understanding of prosecutorial work as key.2 In the USA, this line of study is well 
established.3 Across  Europe  this  is  less  true  though  studies  in  more  recent  years  highlight  the  central 
influence of prosecutorial efforts there too.4 Many European jurisdictions feature a traditional abhorrence 
of  plea‐bargaining  (and  its  functional  equivalents). 5  Prosecutors  have  therefore  been  regarded  as 
administrators of criminal justice in the bureaucratic sense simply following the letter of the law. Academic 
study of  them was regarded as unnecessary.6 Indeed offence was often  taken at  the suggestion research 
could reflect anything but prosecutors adhering to the procedural ideals of the system.7 Any notion of this 
group of  steady professionals negotiating  cases out of  the  system;  i.e.  away  from  trial, was  considered 
untoward. Nevertheless, regardless of their varied principled  foundations, criminal  justice systems across 
the Old Continent have adopted functional equivalents to plea‐bargaining. This paper discusses the impact 
of such practices and their  implications for  justice.  In so doing  it also aims to highlight the danger of our 
very considerable knowledge lacuna and the need for comprehensive research.8  
In undertaking  this  task,  this paper  revisits  the  results of a study completed  in 2008 at  the University of 
Goettingen.9 It does so because efforts to replicate the study have proved impossible. It remains difficult to 
gain  broad  statistical  understanding  of  prosecutorial  work  ‐  and  therefore  the  endings  designated  for 
swathes of cases being processed in criminal justice systems ‐ across Europe. It should be highlighted that 
                                                 
1 Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham. Many thanks are due to Richard Young and the two 
anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous versions of this paper. 
2 Tonry, M. (2012), p. 1; for how strongly prosecutorial structures and priorities influence outcomes see also 
Johnson, Boerner, Wright and Miller and Caplinger (all 2012). 
3 see e.g. the work of Ronald Wright, Maximo Langer, and e.g. Tonry (2014). 
4 see. e.g. Jehle/Wade 2006, Fionda (2008), More recently King/Lord 2018, Rodgers (2017). 
5 Thaman (2010), p. xvii and xxii. Damaska (2010) 86-90. For an explanation of the conceptual conflict 
involved, see Brants (2010), 181-184. See also e.g. Spain which traditionally avoided prosecutorial measures 
of the nature dealt with by this study see Aebi/Balcells (2008) p. 317 but note the dominant role now played 
by the conformidad (in newer, controversial form) - see Thaman (2010 Typology) 371 et seq, Vadell (2015) 
20 and Bachmaier (2015) 97-101. For a summary of the principles affected see Altenhain (2010) 161 et seq. 
6 On the shocking discovery of the reality see Thaman (2010 Typology) 387 and Deal (1982). 
7 Albrecht, H.J. (2007); see also Boyne (2007), 255 
8 Tonry (2012), 4 and 26 categorises the lack of research as “remarkable.” For Italy see Vicoli (2015) 143. 
9 Thanks are due to Lorena Bachmaier, Jackie Hodgson, Chris Lewis, Erika Roth, Paul Smit and Piotr 




the  provision  of  full  information  about  the  legal  paths  open  to  prosecutors,  the  statistics  recorded 
remained  incomprehensible for many countries. They simply could not be explained by what rapporteurs 
explained as  legally possible. The data clearly  testified  to huge case movement at  the prosecutorial  level 
within a  large number of  the criminal  justice  systems being examined. The  law, however, provided  little 
information  as  to  what  could  be  happening.  The  law  in  the  books  was  either  entirely  ignorant  of 
prosecutors  filtering  cases  out  of  the  system  or  it  spoke  of  such  tools  as  exceptional  measures;  a 
characterization  not  borne  out  statistically.  The  numbers  showed  prosecutors  designating  only  small 










professional cultures11 and would vigorously deny any suggestion  that  they do anything but advance  the 
interests of  justice. How this (self‐)perception can be squared with the rather stark reality of our systems 
the statistics  reflect  is examined utilising Sykes and Matza’s seminal Techniques of Neutralization. Whilst 






2. What Prosecutors Do 
2.i. Prosecutorial Action Categorised 
 
The Goettingen  study  classified  prosecutorial  action  into  6  categories:  The  simple  drop,  public  interest 
drop, conditional disposal, penal order, trial by “special procedure” and cases brought before court.12 Many 
but not all jurisdictions studied13 feature all options and there may be more than one procedural variation 
                                                 
10 Council of Europe, 1999, 93 et seq. ; WODC 2003, 87 et seq., WODC 2006, 87 et seq., 2010,  et seq., 
Heuni, 2014, 111 et seq., HEUNI 2017, 111 et seq. 
11 Which do, indeed, appear to be key in ensuring that the excesses associated with criminal justice in the 
USA do not become established in European jurisdictions. See Luna/Wade (2010). 
12 For a comparative typology of many of these case-ending categories, see Thaman (2010 Typology), 331-
371. 
13 Croatia, England and Wales, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 










to  those covered by amnesty,  featuring  insufficient evidence, etc.  In many cases,  these decisions will be 
made  on  technical  grounds.21 Naturally  cases  in  which  prosecutors  have  decided  not  to  seek  further 
evidence, or order  further steps  to attempt  to  identify a perpetrator, will also swell  the numbers of  this 









                                                 
14 see Elsner et al (2008). 
15 Graphical depictions and more detailed explanation of its findings can be found in Wade (2006) and Jehle 
et al (2008). Detailed explanations for each country, explaining all categories as applied, can be found in: 
See Aubusson de Cavarlay (2006), 191 et seq.; Lewis (2006), Elsner and Peters (2006), Blom and Smit 
(2006); Bulenda, Gruszczynska, Kremplewski and Sobota (2006); Zila (2006), Turkovic (2008), Roth 
(2008), Aebi and Balcells (2008), Gilleron and Killias (2008), p. 340 et ses. and Hakeri (2008). Similar for 
Scotland see Leverik (2010), 138 et seq., Denmark, Wandall (2010), 231-232, 236-238. 
16 Note for instance the effect of reforms in Spain coming into force in 2015 which allowed police to close 
cases in which no perpetrator has been identified and there is insufficient evidence to provide real prospects 
of a case being built. A 51% drop in the number of criminal cases reported - see Memoria de la Fiscalía 
General del Estado 2017. In Denmark, police initiate VOM - Wandall (2010), 239-240. Leverik (2010), 131 
provides a statistical overview of case-endings in Scotland, including the police impact. 
17 Blom and Smit (2006), 247. 
18 Asp (2012), 148. 
19 Elsner and Peters (2006), 224. 
20 French police are subservient - see See Aubusson de Cavarlay (2006), 198; as are the Polish see Bulenda, 
Gruszczynska, Kremplewski and Sobota (2006), 273 but note also the special procedural form for petty 
offences p. 274. Croatian  and Turkish police have no case-closing role see Turkovic (2008), 278 and Hakeri 
(2008), 364. 





as  policing  measures  in  the  UK  whilst  continental  European  jurisdictions  would  view  these  as  key 
prosecutorial  options.24 Despite  political  rhetoric  that  such  measures  in  the  UK  should  led  to  tougher 
responses to crime, indications are that use is very much in line with prosecutorial patterns in continental 
Europe as criminal justice systems struggle to cope with their caseload.25 
The public  interest drop covers cases  in which a prosecutor decides there  is a case to answer under the 
criminal  law but concludes that pursuit of an  identified perpetrator can be halted as e.g. the  interests of 
justice do not demand a prosecution in that particular case.26 Such decisions are associated with an internal 
record (in police and prosecution case management systems) that the suspect is presumed guilty. There is, 




that  the case need not be brought to trial. However, the public  interest/interests of  justice  (or whatever 
procedural measure is used28) is viewed as demanding some action against the suspect to counter‐act the 




                                                 
23 Notable exceptions include King and Lord (2016) 
24 See Ministry of Justice (2014); 
25 BBC (2013 Community Resolutions); Bowcottt (2014) 
26 Note also that the diving line between simple and public interest drops is not always clearly drawn. Thus 
e.g. the criteria for drops mentioned for Basel Stadt (Switzerland) are mostly technical and thus simple drops 
but consideration that the accused “is so strikes by the immediate consequences of the offence that an 
additional punishment would be inadequate” - all covered in the same procedural norm, clearly falls within 
the public interest criteria. Statistically these are, however, inseparable. See Gilleron and Killias (2008) p. 
344. 
27 On this point see Thaman (2010 typology), 334). 
28 See Aubusson de Cavarlay (2006), 190; Elsner and Peters (2006), 221; the procedures described in 
Bulenda, Gruszczynska, Kremplewski and Sobota (2006), 267 have now been reformed and expanded upon 
see art. 335 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure; Turkovic (2008), 277 and 286; Roth (2008), 299 but 
note that the new Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure (in force since the 1st July 2018) expands upon the 
potential use of conditional disposals. See also Hakeri (2008), 361 et seq. and 367. 
29 Note also recent proposals to crate such options across the UK as a diversionary measure - Rawlinson 
(2017) and Lammy (2017), 28 et seq. 
30 See Aubusson de Cavarlay (2006), 194-195; Roth (2008), 301. Note also that systems refusing to 
introduce this kind of option, such as Spain, end up with less possibilities for victims as plea-bargaining 
becomes dominant - see Aebi and Balcells (2008), 326. For explanation of how they stand in contrast to 
inquisitorial philosophy see Rogacka-Rzewnicka (2010), 288-291. 
  





bargains  in  the  US  experience  this  “trial  tax,”  withstanding  prosecutorial  power  ups  the  stakes  for 
defendants across Europe.34 
The  penal  order  category  refers  to  a  paper  based  route  via  which  a  formal  conviction  is  achieved.  It 
involves a prosecutor filling out a standard form applying35 for a punishment ‐ in the vast majority of cases 
a  pecuniary  fine  or,  in  a  few  cases,  a  suspended  term  of  imprisonment  ‐ which will  almost  always  be 
approved by the relevant court after cursory viewing. Notification of the conviction  is then posted to the 
assumed  criminal  with  details  of  their  appeal  rights.  Procedures  vary  amongst  jurisdictions  but  allow 
persons thus convicted between 8 and 30 days to contest their conviction. Thereafter the decision becomes 
final. A criminal record and enforcement of punishment ensues in the normal manner. 




quantitative research rear their head  in this category also.  It proved  impossible to ensure that guilty plea 
proceedings be ascribed to this category. Because those remain a formal court decision, not usually marked 
as  involving  a  special  procedure,  they  frequently  remain  hidden  within  normal  trial  statistics.  For  this 





and punishment of  an  identified  suspect. As mentioned  above,  this  category will, however,  contain  the 
cases regardless of whether this was achieved  in a more efficient manner via a guilty plea36 or whether a 
full trial ensued. It is illuminating that the countries featuring a greater proportion of cases in this category 
                                                 
31 Elsner and Peters (2006), 223; Bulenda, Gruszczynska, Kremplewski and Sobota (2006), 263. See also 
Leverik (2010), 143. Note also the stifling affect upon use when the victim’s consent is required for a 
conditional dismissal (Krapac 2010, 266). 
32 See Aubusson de Cavarlay (2006), 191-195; note that in Hungary payments to the victim or for a specific 
purpose are required, Roth (2008), 300. King and Lord (2018), 61-63.  
33 Note that a prosecutorial waiver leads to a criminal record in Sweden (Asp, 2012, 156/7). 
34 See Aprile (2014), 30,  Luna and Wade (2010), 8; Luna (2005), 703; Langer (2006) 223, 225-26, Wright 
and Miller (2003), 1409 & 10;  and Wright and Miller (2003 Screening), 30-36 
35 Not in Norway where it is an entirely independent prosecutorial procedure - Strandbakken (2010), 252-
253. 
36 For an overview of plea bargaining law and practices in 30 Council of Europe Member States see paras. 62 
et seq of the Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v Georgia judgement of the European Court of Human Rights 






2.ii. Prosecutorial Action Evaluated 
Greatly simplified, the core conclusions of the eleven country Goettingen study were that criminal  justice 
systems  across  Europe,  from  all  legal  families  and  even  if  relatively  well  resourced,  are  overloaded. 
Practitioners working within them had been left seeking ways to cope. The “classic” criminal justice process 
‐  the one which permeates public consciousness of how a conviction  is  reached  ‐  is exceptional  in most 
jurisdictions. The  reality of  criminal  justice  in Europe demonstrates  clear parallels with  the US  system.39 
Whilst  it  may  not  be  plea‐bargaining  strictu  sensu  taking  the  place  of  the  “classic”  trial,  diversionary 
measures or abbreviated court proceedings are the pre‐dominant path chosen to secure a criminal justice 
response  to suspected offending. Sometimes  this  is associated with a presumption,  rather  than a  formal 
finding, of guilt so a suspected perpetrator avoids the full stigma of conviction. To a very significant degree, 
however,  either  diversionary measures  or  abbreviated  court  proceedings  are  used  and  the  latter  even 
impose a full conviction albeit without the drama (and potential publicity) of a full trial. This shift is directly 






More  rarely  this  development  creates  a  greater  role  for  the  defendant  (or  defence  counsel)  in  such 
proceedings  meaning  their  influence  upon  a  criminal  justice  response  is  increased.43 This  is  true  in 
negotiated proceedings  (often proportionate  to  the strength of  representation a defendant can afford44) 
but  also more  significant  in  unusual  procedural  forms  such  as  e.g.  the  Polish  “voluntary  submission  to 
                                                 
37 With prosecutors now key to such scenarios - Lewis (2012) III.D and E 
38 For details see: Wade (2006) and (2008a) - as well as sources cited in footnote 16. See also Leverik (2010) 
147 for (plea-dominated) Scotland. 
39 Stuntz 2004 and 2001; Langer 2006; Miller 2004 
40 Dutch police can e.g. impose penal orders of up to 225 Euros - Brants (2010) 209. 
41 See Luna Wade 2010 and 2014; for detailed analysis of an example of judicial distaste for this see King 
and Lord (2018),  53 et seq. on the Innospec case. 
42 See Langer (2006). 
43 On this general perception of plea bargaining see Alge (2013) section 3. For an example of potential forum 
shopping, see King and Lord (2018), 48. Note the UK’s explicit referral to companies seeking to engage with 
US authorities who could offer deferred prosecution arrangements (rather than dealing with UL law 
enforcement) as a reason for introducing these in Britain - p. 69. On the dampening effect this can have on 
law enforcement activity see Sittlington and Harvey (2018), 438. 
44 For judicial discomfort at unduly lenient sentences resulting from serious fraud cases involving powerful 
























                 
45 See Bulen
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is  thus more visible  than  it would be  in many systems  in which much would be subsumed by  the “cases 
before a court” category. On the other hand this picture surprises because German law still clings firmly to 
a  fiction of prosecutorial discretion as a procedural exception.48 Famously  for  legal comparators  it  is also 
the jurisdiction regarded as sticking to its principle of mandatory prosecution.49 
In this filtering process established as the norm across Europe by the Goettingen study, prosecutors play 






Indeed  the  law  has  frequently  followed  practice  and  even  systems  traditionally  adverse  to  any 
incorporation  of  “plea‐bargaining”  have  capitulated  to  encompass  procedures  one  would  struggle  to 
defend against the label. Spain saw prosecutors deciding in 67% of all criminal cases registered to present 
charges to court in 2017. In 77% of those cases, however, a plea agreement was entered meaning that the 
conformidad  proceedings  is  factually  the  primary  form  of  case‐ending  used  in  the  majority  of  cases.52 
Germany  too  features a  formal plea‐bargaining procedure  (Absprache)53 though prosecutorial drops and 
disposals still see far more frequent use than that path. 
                                                 
47 cf e.g. with England and Wales and the Netherlands. 
48 see the language of the criminal procedure code, available in translation at. Paras 153 et seq are 
particularly relevant – I won’t keep editing these notes because it’s obvious they are still under construction. 
49 see the classic debate between Langbein and Weinreb (1978) and Goldstein and Marcus (1977) as well as 
German works pointing to the reality challenging the then widely accepted legal fiction e.g. Kausch (1980). 
50 Jehle et al (2008). 
51 Note that in the Netherlands the transition to a prosecutor dominated system was more strongly deliberated 
- see van de Bunt and van Gelder (2012), p. 119; see clear response to strain Bachmaier (2015) 103-105. For 
another example of coping see Westmarland et al (2018) 3,7, 10-12 detailing use of restorative justice label 
processes to deal with domestic violence possibly also to increase case-closure statistics. Note the need even 
where the system expressly steers against such Caianiello (2012) 255. 
52 Memoria de la Fiscalía General del Estado 2017 - with thanks to Lorena Bachmeier-Winter  
53 See Peters, J. (2008) Die Normierung der Absprachen im Strafverfahren 
  
Poland54 has  continued  on  its  path  to  greater  efficiency  and  the  voluntary  submission  to  punishment 
proceedings (by which a defendant’s lawyer not only qualifies the nature of his or her acts but also suggests 
the appropriate punishment  ‐ of up  to 15 years  imprisonment  ‐  in  its application  to court)55 have gained 
greater scope since 2015. In practice, however, the use of these proceedings has decreased significantly in 
proportion to the prosecutor‐led application for conviction without trial56 which has become a penal order 
type  procedure.  Hungary  saw  even  more  recent  law  reform  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  criminal 




2.iii. Reflecting on Prosecutorial Action 
The  central  aim of  this paper  is  to highlight what prosecutorial practices may mean on  the meta‐level. 
Persistent practice of this nature ‐ particularly in the convergent trend across Europe ‐ leaves its mark upon 
prosecutorial  working  culture  and  the  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  prosecutor.  Long‐term 
practice has rendered the exceptional coping mechanisms the norm  for professionals working within our 
criminal justice systems. 
Each  criminal  justice  system  is,  however,  also  a  sum  of  its  parts meaning  the  intended  exception  now 
constitutes  the  system  and  therewith  the  usual  reaction  to  crime.  The  Goettingen  study  identified 
prosecutors as ranking cases and selecting criminal  justice system responses  in order to achieve the best 
approximation of justice they could (as they, or indeed guidelines of Ministries overseeing their work, see 




How  criminal  justice  responses  are  achieved  has  become  a  matter  of  routine  to  criminal  justice 
practitioners59 to the extent that trends are visible as to what the appropriate reaction should be. There is a 
clear sense of what constitutes “the going rate”60 for certain types of offending and offender. This can also 
be observed  in a European trend.61 During the Goettingen study, we as an  international,  inter‐disciplinary 
research  team were  surprised  about how much our  systems  factually had  in  common; how unified  the 
                                                 
54 With thanks to Piotr Sobota for the provision of updated information 
55 Article 387 Code of Criminal Procedure 
56 Article 355 Code of Criminal Procedure 
57 With thanks to Erika Roth. 
58 See e.g. Wade (2009), Elsner and Peters (2006) p. 222. 
59 For a description of this analysed in the US American context see Rosset and Cressy (1976, p. 90). 
60 For specific crime contexts see e.g. Sanders et al 2010, p. ; Wade (2009); note that office culture can 
counter-act such consensus even where legislated for, Krajewski (2012) p. 108 but also that the value 
attached to individual prosecutor independence in Italy may also stand against this, Ruggiero (2015) 80; on 
the difficulty of balancing with judicial power and constitutional principle there see Vicoli (2015) 147-151. 
61 Tonry (2012),19 observes that many European systems have “well-established and frequently used 




Whilst  it  is  important  to  record  the  study  recognising  prosecutors  as  generally  motivated  to  achieve 
positive  social  impact with  the  resources  accessible  to  them,63 the  predominant  lesson  of  our  research 
remains  that  a  striving  for  efficiency  is  the  core  and  dominant  driver  of  system  change.  The  tailored, 
individualised justice procedural codes and popular depiction  lead us to expect have become exceptional. 
The  decisive  decision  determining  the  state  response  to  crime  is  usually  taken  by  a  prosecutor  after  a 
cursory look at key case characteristics. 
Within this culture charge reduction and achieving “justice of sorts” has become a part of prosecutorial life 
and  therewith  criminal  justice’s  default  setting.  The  UK  provides  an  instructive  example.  It  features  a 
















It  is  interesting  to note  that  the Director of  the  Serious  Fraud Office  (SFO)  also used press exposure  to 
emphasise the expectation that those investigated must cooperate with his agency in order to benefit from 
the  leniency of conditional disposals now available to  it.64 This  is rational within the system setting of the 
SFO.  However,  it  must  be  noted  this  is  the  very  office  charged  with  the  criminal  investigation  and 
                                                 
62 See how strongly the various case-ending forms can be associated with various offences and types of 
offender, shown below in figure XXX. Note also the disquiet apparent in England and Wales at disposals 
being used differently e.g. to dispose of repeat offenders cases without imposing conditions, demonstrating 
agreement on this point - House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2015) p. 5. 
63 And indeed very significant individual efforts to e.g. increase the significance of procedures such as 
victim-offender mediation as a criminal justice response (see e.g. Brants (2010) 212-213) and some e.g., 
make specific efforts also to ensure that fines extracted from suspected perpetrators benefit organisations 
who support their victims (such as safe houses). 
64 Ruddick 2017 Serious Fraud Office boss warns big names to play ball - or else 
  
prosecution of the  institutions responsible for the 2008 financial crisis and all the social harm  it caused.65 





cost‐effectiveness  dictate  that  where  criminal  justice  practitioners  meet  resistance,  they  compromise. 
Prosecutors, police officers and indeed even legislators will most likely meet resistance when investigating 





3. What Prosecutors Regard themselves as Doing 
 
In spite of this portrayal of the sum of what prosecutors do, there is every reason to believe they 
would - across Europe - take great umbrage to any suggestion they are undermining criminal justice 
in any way. Prosecutors are more likely to insist that they take decisions as outlined above with the 
express intention to preserve their criminal justice systems and the constitutional principles they 
operationalise. Given the reality they find themselves facing, their chosen path is the only route to 
preventing the collapse of this system. In interviews with prosecutors,68 researchers repeatedly 
establish that prosecutorial decision-making and actions are principled in nature. When pushed as to 
why specific decisions are made, I have experienced prosecutors frequently looking baffled and - 
after some pause for thought - asserting very fundamental, constitutional principles as guiding their 
work. Although this point is far from empirically established, it chimes with (results from studies 
including participant observation alongside interviews) Boyne’s conclusion that “The soul of the 
German prosecution service resides in the ongoing commitment of individual prosecutors to the 
Rechtsstaat”69 and Hodgson’s70 finding that “the conventional ‘ideals’ retain a continuous force and 
relevance for procureurs, who describe their work (both as they understand it to be and as they 
would wish it to be) in these terms and whose crime control orientation is shielded by redefining it 
in terms of “representing the public interest.’” 
 
Despite the persuasiveness of such principled thinking, one need not look far to find evidence of 
prosecutors thinking very pragmatically on such points. Some chief prosecutors declare their 
systems as unable to cope71 and when questioned about specific practices, prosecutors do also 
defend as necessary the decisions causing the patterns of case-endings described above. Arguments 
one would associate with Paker’s crime control model72 are also easily found.  
                                                 
65 Note also the apparent political recognition that the current situation is inadequate - see (Travis 2017). 
66 See Alge (2013) section 6.2. for such extrapolation of the logic of the BAE systems settlement.  
67 See e.g. Hallsworth (2006). 
68 Documented in e.g. Albers et al (2013), Wade (2008) and (2011). 
69 P. 271. this Rechtsstaat is, of course, associated with the principle of mandatory prosecution. 
70 2002 p. 228 (fn 4). Note also Hodgson’s surprise at this as a finding which emerged after interviews 
rather than an expected structural feature. 
71 - reference to “public would understand if we were able to explain”; law and policy article  (reviewed)  
72 Packer (1964). 
  
 
Nevertheless, abhorrence at US style plea-bargaining is pervasive across Europe. Practice there is 
regarded as coercive, taking unconscionable risks of convicting innocents and imposing hideously 
disproportionate punishment. 73  The distinct prosecutorial cultures to be found across Europe 
highlight professional dedication to not doing this. Ultimately the use of the “classic” full trial so 
consistently across Europe also suggest that prosecutors do subscribe to the ideals of justice and 
make very considerable efforts to ensure that serious offenders - as defined by the current norms of 
the system - face justice in the terms described as ideal by that system. The most serious 
punishment - deprivation of liberty - is consistently achieved across Europe via full trial (clearly 
distinguishing criminal justice systems there from US American models). 
 
Explaining human attitudes and behaviour in a one-dimensional manner would be a counter-
scientific undertaking. It would be odd to expect any kind of purist professional culture particularly 
when forged - as are prosecutorial ones across Europe - under considerable practical pressures. As 
indicated above, however, there is not a sufficient basis of evidence upon which to draw 
conclusions about what motivates prosecutors across Europe. Indeed, if for example one accepts 
Packer’s models of criminal process, given the dominance of crime control rhetorics, it would be 
odd to find prosecutors not also espousing such values. Nevertheless the due process model, 
encapsulating constitutional ideals, also embodies powerful arguments likely to be attractive to 
lawyers sworn to uphold their constitutions. And those studies available documenting prosecutorial 
behaviour do indeed indicate these as important. Why else do prosecutors assign those they are 
convinced have committed the most heinous crimes to procedures most strongly protecting their 
human rights? It seems plausible therefore to assume that prosecutors do also subscribe to the core 
or ideal values our criminal justice systems espouse. The dedication they express in interviews to 
constitutional values is genuine.  
 
Given the results produced in the majority of cases by the criminal justice systems those prosecutors 
populate, however, the question is raised how prosecutors can demonstrate such devotion to values 
they must be regarded as effectively undermining with a majority of their actions? Prosecutors can 
thus be added to the groups of criminal justice professionals clinging to a belief in their role 
apparently contradicted by the reality of everyday practice.74 
 
How prosecutors see themselves is, furthermore, not only important for its own sake. Its influence 
reaches well beyond national criminal justice systems. The most obvious example is provided by 
the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) within the framework of the 
European Union.75 That amounts to the creation of a supra-national criminal justice agency at the 
European level. This revolutionary step is being undertaken in recognition of the failure of national 
systems to deal with crimes compromising the financial interests of the European Union.76 It is 
justified by the serious nature of the organised crime being undertaken. Given the traditions 
prevalent in many EU member states, one might reasonably expect the EPPO to operate based upon 
a principle of mandatory prosecution. Indeed this would be consistent with the mechanisms the 
Goettingen study demonstrates systems resorting to in order to ensure court time can be devoted to 
such serious crime. 
                                                 
73 Bachmeier (2010). 
74 See Newman (2013) on legal aid defence lawyers in the UK and Shiner (2010) on police officers 
believing their own “colour blindness” 
75 See Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's 
Office COM/2013/0534 final - 2013/0255 (APP) resulting in Regulation (EU) 2017/1939. 
76 See European Commission (2013a). 
  
Legislative negotiations were, however, steeped in the understanding that prosecutors dealing with 
financial crime negotiate and do deals with those they suspect of wrong-doing.77 Interestingly 
records of negotiation within the Council demonstrate that the power to facilitate a negotiated case-
ending (the so-called “transaction”) was the subject of intense debate. A few member states 
questioned whether such a power should be granted but others insisted this power must be far 
greater.78 The clear majority viewed such powers as important. The solution reached and passed 
into law as article 40 of the EPPO Regulation could not see EU law predetermined by domestic law 
any more strongly. The EPPO can now end cases in accordance with the criminal procedural 
options available in the member state in which a case is being dealt with.79 The domestic norm will 
determine supra-national prosecutorial practice. This revolutionary office is not expected to tackle 
the crimes falling within its remit in a revolutionary manner. The supra-national level is learning 
directly from the domestic. This despite the EPPO’s very raison d’être being that the criminals it 
should be countering are well-resourced, organised and operating across transnational boundaries. 
Again it seems the crimes of the powerful benefit most clearly from systemic learned dedication to 
efficiency, especially when achieved via bargaining.80 
The central point is clear. Negotiated case endings and informal case-disposition have become so 
integral to criminal justice responses to crime that any idea of not giving prosecutors negotiating 
and discretionary powers is generally viewed as ridiculous. The dominant prosecutorial culture 
established across Europe overshadows our practical concept of justice to such an extent that even 
new systems - intended to deal with entirely different or only a very limited proportion of criminal 
phenomena - automatically become marked by it. Individual prosecutors too learn their trade in 
domestic settings, grow to understand what it is to be a prosecutor in their first role and carry those 
lessons with them throughout their careers.81 This may act as a useful check on the exercise of 
powers, preventing extremes seen elsewhere; 82  nevertheless they are pervasive and will also 
transcend the national sphere, when career trajectories do. 
 
The volte face of international criminal justice might also be explained (at least partially) in this 
way. When plea-bargaining was first discussed in that context in the mid-1990s, Cassesse’s 
abhorrence to it marked the system.83 Less than 10 years later, as the system began dealing with an 
overwhelming case-load, the practice became prevalent.84 Prosecutors faced with an all too familiar 
problem, reverted to their routine tools to solve it. 
 
Such developments should highlight the urgency of understanding prosecutorial work. Not only is 
transparency concerning how criminal justice systems deal with the bulk of cases desirable. The 
frameworks practitioners and politicians take for granted in the “production” of criminal justice 
deeply mark our national criminal justice systems as well as any extensions of punitive reach. 
                                                 
77 Such logic can also be found within national systems: see Mazzacuva (2014), King and Lord (2018). 
78 Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2016, 5. and annex 1. 
79 Regulation 2017/1939. See Raffaraci and Belfiore (2019). 
80 For an analysis of different defendants ability to “play the system” see Alge (2013) section 5, see also 
Brants (2010) 184, 205-206 for bargaining occurring due to the power of the adversary. Note also the nexus 
between increased discretion and degradation of equality before the law - Asp (2012) 155. 
81 Boyne (2007), Roth (2013), Thomas III (2008) and e.g. A.B.A 1992 and Sullivan et al (2007). 
82 as suggested by Damaška (1975) see also Luna/Wade (2010), Part III. 
83 See Morris/Scharf (1995), 652. 
84 See Damaška (2010), 101 et seq. Though on the issues involved see Amory-Combs (2012).  
  
Deeper knowledge facilitating reflection upon these practices and their effects is surely all the more 
important, therefore, as transnational criminal justice grows in import. 
 
 
4. Reconciling  Prosecutorial Beliefs and Actions 
 
In  order  to  illuminate  how  the  study  findings  can  be  reconciled with  continuing  prosecutorial  belief  in 
traditional justice “values”, this paper applies a framework developed by Gresham Sykes and David Matza. 
The Techniques of Neutralization85 is a seminal criminological paper published in 1957 and will doubtlessly 
surprise when  raised  in  a paper of  this  kind.  It  is,  after  all,  sub‐headed  “A  Theory of Delinquency”  and 
addresses juvenile delinquency specifically. 
The  purpose of  this paper  is not  to  suggest  that  prosecutors  across  Europe  are  engaging  in delinquent 
conduct.  Rather,  Sykes  and  Matza’s  framework  demonstrates  how  behaviour  seemingly  challenging 
overarching norms can be undertaken even though the validity of those norms  is,  in fact, recognised and 




This exploration  is not seeking to  imply that prosecutors,  in the main, are engaging  in these practices for 
any other reason than to maximise the positive effects of their work, given the resources at their disposal. 
There is no intimation of individual wrong‐doing. The suggestion is far more, that our systems, as a sum of 
all  of  these  individual,  seemingly  rational  and  justifiable  decisions,  are  mutating  into  something  very 
different than what we as societies ‐ including prosecutors ‐ intend and presumably would want. Alongside 
explaining how prosecutors can do one  thing and genuinely believe another, Sykes and Matza’s  scheme 
also  highlights  starkly  the  impact  prosecutorial  practices  are  having.  As  a  tool,  the  techniques  of 
neutralisation demonstrate how, as the exception has become the norm, the way in which the majority of 
cases are dealt with by  criminal  justice  systems has altered  the very nature of what  these  systems as a 
whole achieve.86. 
 
4.i. Sykes and Matza’s “The Techniques of Neutralization”87 and Prosecutorial Practice Analysed 
Sykes and Matza fundamentally challenged the  idea that all rule‐breaking  is grounded  in an  idea that the 
rule  lacks validity for those breaking  it. They challenge the notion that subcultural theory and theories of 
anomie  ‐  and  thus  rejection  of  the  dominant  social  norm  by  groups  encompassing  individuals  who 
undertake  criminal  behaviour  ‐  explains  offending.  They  cite  their  observation  of  juvenile  boys  being 
questioned  about  delinquent  behaviour  very much  understanding  a  difference  between  good  and  bad, 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Indeed they demonstrate the boys as not only acquiescing to but 
agreeing with  the overriding  social norms  they  find  themselves  accused of  breaching.  Sykes  and Matza 
highlight  that  these  boys,  however,  proffer  reasons  why  their  behaviour  is  justified  or  excusable 
summarised in 5 “techniques of neutralization.” 
                                                 
85 Sykes and Matza (1957). 
86 See also Ashworth and Zedner (2008) and (2015). 
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the  laws  in which they believe”88 They explain the techniques they  identify as providing “justifications for 
deviance.”  
This paper utilises this theory to analyse prosecutorial behaviour  in European jurisdictions and generate a 
clear  understanding  of  how  the  impacts  identified  by  the Goettingen  study  and  beyond  are  produced, 
despite  the  professionals  involved  making  very  significant  efforts  to  uphold  the  dominant  normative 
system. The deviance or breach under discussion here is not of law; but of the idealised notion of criminal 
justice;  the  ‘procedural  norm’  framed  as  central  by  our  criminal  procedures  (and  popular  depictions 




correctness of  the view  ‐ and  legal evaluation  ‐  she has  formed of an event.  Justice  is  then  served by a 
response tailored specifically to the defendant and possibly responsive also to the victim.  
This  paper  invites  the  reader  to  step  away  from  a  strict  application  of  Sykes  and  Matza’s  theory  and 
consider this framework applied to prosecutors undertaking their jobs in adherence to the law. Some of the 













for  many  crimes  against  humans.  The  material  scope  of  criminal  justice  systems  is  established  by  the 
parameters of the criminal  law.  Ironically this  is expanding rather  than contracting across Europe,  just as 
                                                 
88 p. 666 




deliberately  travel  to  less well‐regulated  jurisdictions  can be held accountable  for  crimes of  child abuse 
they perpetrate there.91 Nevertheless a western European citizen accusing a fellow citizen e.g. of selling a 
counterfeit  life  vest  to  a  refugee  on  a  Turkish  beach  ‐  even  if  that  vests  turns  into  a  millstone which 
precipitates the death of a child wearing it when a vessel capsizes ‐ will likely be told by the criminal justice 
system she might naturally turn  to, that  this  is purely a matter  for Turkish authorities. Locus regit actum 
(the place governs the act), no matter how morally abhorrent actions may be. 
This  well‐established  and  fundamental  principle  geared  to  deny  responsibility  poses  problems  for  the 









engaged.  Addressing  socially  harmful  behaviour  is  increasingly  a  task  not  ascribed  to  criminal  justice 
systems.95 Where  this  forms  part  of  a  principled  effort  to  decriminalise  less  serious  behaviour,  the 
arguments of this paper provide strong reason to support this.96 Where, however, this is done in relation to 
behaviour entailing  serious  social harm  it  is problematic;  threatening  to undermine  the  very essence of 
criminal  justice.97 At  a  systematic  level,  criminal  justice  responsibility  is  denied  via  the  creation  of 
alternative  systems  meaning  that  some  socially  harmful  behaviour  is  not  subject  to  the  same  social 
stigmatisation nor faces as potentially effective and stringent regulation and punishment. The most obvious 
example of this  is the compliance based response to the 2008 financial crisis.98 It  is telling that  it was the 
                                                 
90 see e.g. Morris (2008). 
91 See e.g. s. 72 of the British Sexual Offences Act 2003. The exceptions made to the UK’s strict 
jurisdictional regime are summarised in Archbold (2019) 2-35-2-88 and CPS guidance available at: 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/jurisdiction 
92 See e.g. Wade (2009). 
93 See e.g. European Commission 2013a. 
94 highlighted in Roth (2013). 
95 Ashworth and Zedner (2008), Hunt (2014), Lacoeur (2018) 
96 Note also that despite broad efforts to “westernise” after the fall of the iron curtain, many formerly 
communist European countries have retained the group of less serious offences - including theft below a 
certain value - to be dealt with by social or community courts rather than the criminal justice system. See 
Bulenda et al. 259, Thaman  (2010), 333. 
97 Ashworth and Zedner (2008); Hunt (2014); Wade (2009). Note also the British Government’s suggestion 
that it will accept an EU Framework Decision on Defence Rights in Criminal Proceedings if terrorist 
suspects are excluded from the presumption of innocence (Discussed at EU Presidency Conference (2007)). 
  
finance  ministers  of  EU  countries  who  met  in  Brussels  to  discuss  further  regulation  and  not  those 
concerned  with  criminal  law  enforcement.99 Such  a  response  better  accommodates  the  crimes  of  the 
powerful particularly as circumstances change and they are able to undertake more sophisticated forms of 
criminality.100 It  seems  reasonable  to  expect  prosecutors  to mirror  such  approaches,  defining  out  crime 
where the fit to the traditional boundaries of their tasks is not obviously met. “I am a prosecutor of country 
A, an act  in country B even  if perpetrated by or against one of my citizens,  is not my responsibility”  ‐  is a 
thought pattern  to be expected. Adaptive  interpretation of  criminal norms  in order  to pave  the path  to 
prosecute behaviour  which could be defined as criminal as times and modes of perpetration change is not 
to  be  expected  simply  because  it  adds  to  an  already  excessive  workload.101 The  “neighbourhood” 
prosecutors work in will not allow such dynamic adaptation. 
It  is  important  to stress  that such denial of responsibility cannot be explained only by overloading and a 
consequential  search  for  efficiency.  On  the  one  hand,  alternative  systems  are  developed  to  avoid  the 
procedural protections of criminal  justice viewed as overly onerous by some e.g.  in  the counter‐terrorist 
context.102 On  the other hand,  the  failure  to  incorporate responsibility of very socially harmful behaviour 
can  be  viewed  as  accompanying  the  informal  development  of  coping  mechanisms  as  traced  above.  If 






with  their workload  is  likely  to dismiss as absurd any  (un‐resourced) attempt  to broaden  their  remit,  let 
                                                                                                                                                                  
98 Though note that one European jurisdiction (Belgium) long associated with resistance to prosecutorial 
discretion on a principled basis, did attempt to respond by criminal prosecution – only to find its efforts 
frustrated by a deal already reached with Dutch prosecutors. See Reuters 2013 and 2013a, Toussaint (2014). 
This resulted in a Belgian prosecution being barred under the ne bis in idem rules resulting from art. 54 of 
the Convention Implementing the Schengen Accord (for detail see Tchorbadjiyska (2004)). This is the logic 
of the EU approach to ne bis in idem, see Ruggiero (2015) 61. Davis (2016), 100 assesses US refusal to limit 
prosecution after case-disposal measures in other jurisdictions as having a chilling effect on the development 
of such measures. 
99 Council of the European Union (2009), 8. Note also the case of a multi-national too big to prosecute King 
and Lord (2018), 78 et seq. 
100 Again see the arguments behind the creation of an EPPO demonstrating the dangers of leaving an 
enforcement lacuna, making certain crimes attractive to highly-resourceful defendants European 
Commission (2013), 2. 
101 Consider e.g. calls for misogyny to be treated as a hate crime - Quinn (2018) - and the Grenfell fire to be 
viewed as murder, Norrie (2018). Of course, expansive interpretation of norms is not desirable from a rule of 
law point of view and is not what is being advocated here. The point is that the boundaries delineating 
prosecutorial responsibility can leave lacuna as social norms and factors like, e.g. mobility, change. 
102 Secretary of State for the Home Department (1998) 7.11-16. 
103 As evidenced above, see also Altenhain (2010) 159. 
104 For an insight into how the pressures of practice lead the law see also Alge’s (2013) account of how the 
plea agreement powers given to the UK SFO were not intended to facilitate plea-bargaining and how the 
latter received official standing within 3 years. 
  
alone  require  them  to  become  familiar  with  complex  new  substantive  areas  or  to  work  increasingly 
combatively against well‐resourced defendants.105 Since legislators take reforming impetus from this group 
of  professionals,  their  main  concern  ‐  workload  reduction  ‐  will  be  the  transferred  primary  concern. 













4.i.b. Denial of Injury  
The  second  technique  highlighted  is  the  denial  of  injury  described  by  Sykes  and  Matza  as  offenders 
questioning “whether or not anyone has clearly been hurt by his deviance” or asserting that “behavior does 
not really cause any great harm despite the fact that it runs counter to law.”108 





                                                 
105 See the response of prosecutors on detection of trafficking human beings reported in the EuroNEEDs 
study analysed in Wade (2011), 168-169.  
106 This is, for example the logic of negotiating case-ending powers for the EPPO. 
107 See e.g. a recent declaration by the Metropolitan Police that it is unable to consider treating misogyny as a 
hate crime - Quinn (2018); Also Thornberry, 2013. 
108 Sykes and Matza (1957), p. 667. 
109 See also the parallels with Norway, Strandbakken (2010), 246-248, 250-251, for Denmark see Wandall 











Where  decriminalisation  and  discouraging  punitivism  drive  the  agenda,  the  coherence  of  prosecutorial 




significant  loss.  Furthermore,  where  repeat  victimisation  comes  into  play,  each  individual  case  may 
reasonably be disposed of, in accordance to the pattern shown above, but the overall damage done may be 
                                                 
110 Haggenmueller (2013) 100.  
  
considerably greater.111 Any individual (or indeed business) so affected may feel aggrieved and let down by 
the  criminal  justice  and  the  state  in  turn.  Particularly where  expectations  have  been  raised  by  victim‐
inclusive rhetoric, this sense of disappointment may erode the legitimacy of criminal justice systems.112 
Even when cases are taken forward, evidence points to prosecutors systematically reducing charges to fit 
them  into  categories  allowing  for  less  resource‐intensive  treatment.113 Not  pursuing  evidence  of  racial 
motivation for  instance can mean an assault qualifies for a prosecutorial drop or that a case which would 
require referral to a higher court, can be dealt with more quickly  in a  lower one. The treatment of cases 
recorded by  the  statistics  is  the  treatment of cases as categorised as prosecutors. They may  see ordinal 
proportionality in their designation of files and regard their professional duty as done by achieving justice 
of sorts. Victims may feel the justice done in their name is anything but, particularly if significant features of 
of  their  injury  are  ignored  and  therewith,  effectively  denied.  Parallel  to  Sykes  and  Matza’s  findings, 
prosecutors are signalling that they regard (at  least) certain (aspects of)  injury as not really causing harm 
sufficient  to be acknowledged by criminal  justice processes. The  ideal of  individualised, tailored  justice  is 
thus normally abandoned. 
 
4.i.c. Denial of the Victim 
The  next  technique  does  not  deny  the  factual  harm  caused  by  a  delinquent  act  but  relativises  its 
significance,  declaring  in  Sykes  and  Matza’s  words  that  “the  injury  is  not  wrong  in  light  of  the 
circumstances.” They explain “Insofar as the victim  is physically absent, unknown, or a vague abstraction 
(as  is  often  the  case  in  delinquent  acts  committed  against  property),  the  awareness  of  the  victim's 
existence is weakened.”114 
Legislation formulating prosecutors’ options to utilise drops and disposals speak of these as appropriate for 
cases  in which  e.g.  the  defendant’s  guilt  is minor.115 One  of  the  factors  impacting  upon  this  includes  a 
victim’s  behaviour.116 Given  how  prosecutors  construct  cases with  regard  to  their  options  (as  shown  in 
4.i.b.),  it would be surprising  if such construction did not sometimes also extend to denial of victimhood, 
e.g. by qualifying  the victim as equally blameworthy and  thus opening  the door  to  the use of drops and 
disposals for instance. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  this  technique  can  be  evidenced  more  strongly  as  a  denial  of  the 
“relevance” of the victim. Many of the procedural options available to prosecutors ‐ when driven by a need 
for  efficiency  ‐  necessitate  a  sidelining  of  the  factual  experience  of  the  victim.  The  very  logic  of  plea 
                                                 
111 Chakroborti, N. and Garland, J. (2015), 6. 
112 Or prosecutors as responsible for such trends see e.g. Brants (2010) 217. Note also that such 
disappointment can manifest in more concrete problems for the criminal justice systems, such as victims’ 
refusal to participate as witnesses in the future and to advise friends and family against so doing. See e.g. 
CPS Victim and Witness Satisfaction Survey September 2015 - Wood et al, 34 et seq. 
113 See e.g. Thaman (2010) xxix et seq. 
114 Sykes and Matza (1957), 668. 
115 See e.g. 153a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure available in English at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stpo/. 
116 See guidelines, e.g. BOS-Polaris - van den Bunt/van Gelder 2012, 124 and 129; Code for Crown 





an act  is  lesser  than  it might be viewed at  court. Either not all  crimes are  considered119, or aggravating 
factors are  ignored, harms qualified etc. The person  suffering  such harms  is unlikely  to agree with  such 
reductions. As outlines above, they may well be disappointed by their experience becoming side‐lined and 
relativised as the routine of the system takes hold. Victim empowering measures provide clear indication of 
this;  they allow victims to tell  the entirety of their story and the  impact of a crime,  including  factors not 
considered  relevant  by  the  law.120 The  narrowed  consideration  of  even  those  latter  factors  during 
prosecutorial  decision‐making  contributes  to  a  reduction  of  the  legitimacy  with  which  criminal  justice 
systems are viewed.121  
Diversion proceedings  (though doubtlessly positive  from a victimological point of view where e.g. victim‐
offender  mediation  becomes  an  option)  fundamentally  deny  the  relevance  of  victimhood  for  criminal 
justice purposes.  They  intimate  that  the  experience of  victimhood by  an offence  is  less  important  than 
other  factors. Where  that  factor  is  the  victim’s desire  to  participate  in mediation, or  indeed  to  receive 
compensation,  or  see  that  the  perpetrator  seeks  treatment,  this  should  not  be  viewed  as  problematic. 
Given, however, that the majority of diversionary measures are used to serve the efficiency of the system, 
to save it money (or indeed serve to raise funds for the state), this is a very different matter.  





the content of criminal  justice processes as a  routine matter. Overload has primed  the system  to  ignore 
individual features of crimes, victims and indeed perpetrators. Charge‐bargaining is e.g. often engaged in to 
facilitate avoidance of  courts  incorporating  lay participants.123 This demonstrates  that  such decisions are 
driven by  resource  considerations  as procedures before  such  fora  require  greater  amounts of  time  and 
indeed carry a greater risk of less controllable outcomes.124 Motivation of this kind side steps victim‐related 
issues demonstrating  criminal  justice  systems’ denial of  the  relevance of  the  victim  to  the desired  case 
                                                 
117 Which is what the discussed mechanisms are, defendants forego their right to a trial and to appeal - on the 
importance of this aspect, see Bachmaier (2018)  257. 
118 On the distinct difference, see Hodgson (2012) II.A. 
119 And note the need for such an option to be specifically legislated for in European criminal justice systems 
traditionally adhering to a stringent interpretation of the principle of legality, e.g. Poland see Rogacka-
Rzewnicka (2010), 283. 
120 For a description of victim participation measures, see Braun (2019), 1 et seq. 
121 On this concept in relation to corporate crime and negotiated justice, as well as the myriad of relevant 
perspectives see King and Lord (2018), 23-30. 
122 Note the acknowledgement of this inherent in requiring prosecutors to explain such decisions to specific groups of 
victims in a few jurisdictions (e.g. rape victims in Britain) – Ministry of Justice (2015). 
123 Thaman (2010), xxix et seq. 
124 Thaman (2010), xxx. 
  
outcome. The structure of options developed by prosecutors to allow them to cope with overload provide 
ideal  categories  for  them  to  engage  in  the  technique described by  Sykes  and Matza  “awareness of  the 
victim's existence is [indeed] weakened.” 
 
4.i.d. Condemnation of the Condemners 
Sykes and Matza describe a  fourth  technique by which  juvenile delinquents  respond with hostility  to an 
accusation of wrong‐doing;  those  suspects emphasising  that,  in  fact,  it  is  the  system which  sees  fault  in 
them which  is  flawed.  In this way, Sykes and Matza explain  the  juvenile “has changed the subject of the 




upon  his  or  her  innocence. Despite  not  featuring  the  extremes  of  the United  States  system,  European 
criminal  justice  processes  increasingly  demonstrate  features  which  exert  pressure  to  comply  upon 
individuals made  the subject of such proceedings. Even conviction by penal orders can only be appealed 
against for between 8 and 30 days. Surely justice would be better served by suspects being given more time 



















                                                 
125 Sykes and Matza (1957), 668. 
126 Weigend (2004).  
127 See below around footnote 138. 
128 See e.g. Higgins (2018); Johnston (2005 and e.g. Downey et al (2012), 246 
129 Again, proponents of an EPPO without negotiating powers were treated as having no understanding of 
prosecutorial reality (even though, of course, no EU level prosecutorial reality of this kind exists yet).  
  












Condemnation  of  those who  object  to mechanisms  developed  under  the  guise  of  efficiency  is  cased  in 













their system espouses and  they attach value  to,  they will doubtlessly  ‐ and  indeed  reasonably  ‐ point  to 
practice not as designed to undermine such principle but to preserve the functionality of the system as a 




                                                 
130 See  OECD (2016), UK Government Red Tape Challenge and e.g. Rigby (2015) 
131 See Bennett (2018), Wheeler (2011), for US BBC News (2017). 
132  European Commission (2011). 
133 See e.g. Ludford (2013). 
134 See e.g. http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/JITs/jits-funding/Pages/ARCHIVE/jits-funding.aspx 
135 Strongly echoing a technique highlighted by Simon (2008) 25‐26 as used to “govern through crime.” 
136 (1957), 669. 
137 e.g. Sun-Beale (2015) 38, 50-52. 
  






necessary.  Prosecutors  and  those  administering  their work  have  acted  rationally  as  case‐loads  rise  and 
resources become scare. Within the parameters of the system, who could fault their decision‐making? 
The Goettingen study highlighted patterns consistent with prosecutors across Europe doing the best they 
can, with what  they have.139 There  are  clear patterns of principle  from  the prosecutorial  vantage point. 




4.ii. Interim Conclusion 




In  this  consideration of prosecutorial work across Europe, applying  this  line of  thought  appropriately  to 
these professionals is illuminating. Prosecutors are clearly not breaking the law141 but this paper questions 




their work chip away at  its character and warp  it  in the manners described above. Seemingly  in denial of 
the realities of their lived experiences, prosecutors nevertheless defend the ideals of criminal justice. Very 
much  like Newman’s use of Freud when examining defence  lawyers whose daily  reality contradicted  the 
principles  they  honestly  claimed  to work  for,  this  paper  demonstrates  the  utility  of  Sykes  and Matza’s 
seminal  lens  for  a  new  purpose.  The  perspective  it  lends  enables  us  to  understand  the  stark  contrast 
between exasperated prosecutors and  the horrified public  reacting  to headlines of criminal  justice deals 
made with celebrities.143  
                                                 
138 See Luna/Wade (2010) 1496 et seq. 
139 Note expectations of more, not less such practice - e.g. Bachmaier (2018), 238. tracking this trend: Fair 
Trials International (2016). 
140 on pp. 664 and 669.  
141 Of course, it is to be acknowledged that some amongst this group will be. Where the powers highlighted 
above are utilised, e.g. in line with a discriminatory point of view or in accordance with corrupt practices, 
this is - of course - in breach of the law. 
142 Alge (2013) section 7 e.g. views the SFO as “subverting the adversarial system” 
143 E.g. cases against Ronaldo, BAE Systems, Rolls Royce (see Pratley 2017 and King and Lord (2018), 
101 et seq), Helmut Kohl, Steffi Graf and Boris Becker. 
  
Readers may  legitimately question whether the techniques described above are truly relevant to  lawyers. 
Amongst  such  a  huge  group,  it  is  certainly  unlikely  one  explanation  will  prove  sufficient.  There  is 
doubtlessly,  furthermore,  a  difference  between  a  German  Einstellung  and  the  Spanish  conformidad. 
Nevertheless  it  remains  plausible  that  highly  trained,  very  skilled  lawyers  operating  in  these  distinct 
professional  cultures  remain  fundamentally  committed  to  constitutional  values. Utilised as above,  Sykes 




what our  societies demand of prosecutors  and other  criminal  justice professionals. After  all,  in debates 
surrounding criminal  justice, even  the most  fiscally conservative  ‐ politicians, media, and public  ‐  tend  to 
espouse strong  justice values. Discourse  is often marked by crime control  in relation to offenders but the 
debate  surrounding  victims,  treatment  of  the  innocent,  etc.  bears  hallmarks  of  cultural  expectations 
framed  by  the  ideal  of  the  full  trial.144 Sykes  and  Matza’s  scheme  provides  illuminating  insight  when 
analysing  our  responses  to  crimes  against  humans  as  societies.  Prosecutors,  even  if  not  engaging  the 
techniques  of  neutralisation  themselves,  are  at  least  the  agents who  do  so  on  our  behalf.  It  is  elected 
governments which set the true parameters of criminal  justice  in the resources allocated to  it. Public and 
media reaction to deals when made public, clearly signals to criminal  justice professionals that we expect 
them  to allow ourselves  still  to  feel  that we  live  in principled  societies, with  functioning  justice  systems 
worthy of the name. 
 
5. The Increasing Importance of Prosecutorial Work and Knowledge Thereof. 
A  key  concern  is  that we  do  not  know  enough  to  truly  enter  into  the  debate  this  paper  highlights we 






crisis,  resource  allocation was  fundamentally marked  by  taxpayer’s  unwillingness  to  increase  the  funds 
available  to  state  mechanisms.  Given  that  the  most  obvious  solution  ‐  decriminalisation  ‐  is  politically 




                                                 
144 See e.g. Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses. (2010) and Victims’ Commissioner (2015). 
145 See e.g. Boyne (2007) and Wade (2011). 
146 Jehle/Wade (2006), Jehle (2008) and Wade (2008). 
147 Bauman, (1998). 
148 See.e.g. the expansive nature of EU legislation on terrorism requiring the criminalisation of incitement 
and glorification offences; a significant extension into the preparatory realm - e.g. Derencinovic (2010) and 









at  the  idea  that  just  use  of power  can be  associated with  increased,  systemic  discretion.  There  is  little 




another,  towards  a  mass  production  of  guilty  pleas  with  a  number  of  dangers  of  increased  injustice 
highlighted.  Mechanisms  marked,  in  all  but  exceptional  cases,  by  the  hallmarks  of  extreme  actuarial 




become objects of routine treatment. There  is, of course, evidence that all criminal  justice practitioners  ‐ 
even defence lawyers ‐ become sucked into the logic of this system and what those who become entangled 
in  it  “deserve.157”  As  such  criminal  justice  cultures  transcend  national  boundaries,  the  urgency  of 
comprehensively identifying and understanding these developments becomes all the more apparent. 
Deeper examination  is, however, also required because the perspective of criminal  justice practitioners  is 
not  the  only  one  of  relevance.  Criminal  justice  systems  hold  political  worth  because  their  work  is 
considered  important by many  in our societies.158 How else  is the  failure to resort to decriminalisation  in 
the  circumstances  outlined  to  be  explained?  Political  rhetoric  has  furthermore  specifically  engaged 
victims,159 underlining  their  importance  and  emphasising  their  participatory  rights.160 How  our  systems, 
                                                 
149 See Langbein and Weinreb (1978), Boyne (2007) and Luna and Wade (2010). On the dangerous 
influences of sustained culture in Poland see Krajewski (2012), 85-89, 91, 94, 108-9. 
150 See Langer (2006). 
151 See Tonry (2012), 21. 
152 On the contribution of over-charging and sentence length to making negotiated justice coercive see 
Bachmaier (2018), 251 et seq. 
153 And disciplines well beyond it: see in administrative law e.g. Forsyth and Hare (1997) 
154 See e.g. work on stop and search in the UK, particularly when the “restraint” of reasonable suspicion 
disappears – Bowling and Marks (2016),15. 
155 Feeley and Simon (1994); on managerialism Leverik (2010), 154. 
156 Roth (2013), in the Netherlands (with computer-based support) van de Bunt and van Gelder (2012), 125-
130. 
157 Summarised in e.g.  Burton, Sanders and Young (2010), 243-245. 
158 See e.g. Baumann (1998) and Simon (2006). 
159 The extent of this does vary, however, note e.g. how distanced the Dutch prosecutor traditionally was 










takes  for  them  to  currently do  it.The  fundamental  point  and  challenge highlighted,  is  the  clear  tension 
between  what  “justice”  should  be  ‐  and  systems  (alongside  media  and  dramatic  representations)  still 
communicate  to  the general public  that  it  is  ‐, and what  it actually  is,  in  the vast majority of cases. The 
findings  examined  here  indicate  strongly  that  there  is  clear  divergence  between  the  expectations  of 
criminal justice practitioners and their „service users“ as to what they can reasonably achieve. The justice 
prosecutors expect to deliver will mostly be very different from what a victim or indeed a perpetrator might 
expect.  The  public  outcries  at  negotiated  case  settlements  involving  celebrities  are  an  illustration  of  a 
rejection  ‐ at  the  societal  level  ‐ of any notion  that  such proceedings constitute a criminal  justice norm. 







constitutes  justice as socially defined.163 It  is surely unfair to ask criminal  justice professionals, working at 
capacity,  to  disappoint  and  undermine  social  cohesion  and  peace?164 Furthermore,  if  criminal  justice 
systems’  resources are being  funnelled  to exacerbate  the differences  in  treatment of  the more and  less 
powerful, this cannot continue to be their designated purpose? Understanding of criminal  justice systems 
                                                                                                                                                                  
also Brants (2010), 194) and how much difference provision in the criminal procedure code itself makes - 
Asp (2012), 152. 
160 The importance of this development is perhaps best evidenced by the passing of supra-national legislation 
to give effect to victims’ rights via the EU - see Council of the European Union (2001) now replaced with 
European Parliament (2012). 
161 On the notion of voluntariness of agreement see Bachmaier (2018)  as well as Thaman (2010), 327 et seq. 
For an example of the pressures to plead guilty, see e.g. Hales (2018), 60. 
162 For professional recognition of the evolution taking place see e.g. Lord Goldsmith (2011), on the 
imprecations for justice, Bachmaier (2018), 259. On how regulatory treatment downgrades the societal 
perception that crime has taken place, see Leverik (2010), 153, King and Lord (2018), 9, 36 and undermines 
legitimacy (quoting OECD and Transparency Int) 64, 
163 For an examination of the problems inherent where legal meaning diverges strongly from social meaning 
see Norrie (2018). 
164 Boyne (2007), 8, for instance, analyses the divergence between ideal and practice in Germany as 
“threaten[ing] to undercut public confidence in the law and the state itself.” Note also similar fears over 





Ultimately  the aim of  this paper  is  thus  to call  for more honesty surrounding criminal  justice systems.165 
Contrasting political declarations to be tough on crime as well as victim‐oriented with the reality of what 
criminal  justice  professionals  are  facilitated  (and  encouraged166)  to  deliver  would  appear  a  pathway 
designed, ultimately, to cause loss of faith in the criminal justice system by those who need it most. Honest 
discussion  of what works when  imposed  by  the  criminal  justice  system  is  equally  urgently  required.167 
Systems  fundamentally marked and altered by pragmatic adaptation  (the  status quo  in which European 
systems  find  themselves)  require critical examination at  the political and  societal  level. This can only be 
prompted by better knowledge of them. Police officers and prosecutors should not be left to explain to the 
public that they cannot pursue swathes of activity formally falling under the criminal law. The public should 











debate  is  imperative.  The  UK  situation  demonstrates  this.  Faced  with  the  complication  of  regulating 





placing expectations upon criminal  justice systems but  indeed also  to  the professionals who work within 
                                                 
165 On the need for openness to ensure “buy-in” to avoid delegitimising a system see King and Lord (2018), 
30. 
166 Note, for example, that when victim offender mediation was introduced in Germany, the effort of such 
work was not reflected in internal, performance management systems. Thus a penal order is worth more than 
a VOM process in the points allocated to a case disposition for career evaluation purposes. 
167 See e.g. Lambe, (2017). 
168 See also Vadell (2015),15. 
169 So also Thaman (2010 Typology) 396. 
170 For an example of the extent to which victims are ignored in conditional disposals, as well as their 
inability to in any way make themselves heard, see Corruption Watch (2017). Note also that, of course, no 
restoration can be made to unidentified victims. 
  
them and operate with the daily danger of “facing  the music”171 for the perceived  injustice of the  justice 
they consistently, if pragmatically, work hard to deliver. 
                                                 
171 See e.g. press coverage of the Metropolitan Police’s mass screening out of cases e.g. Mullin (2018) as 
well as Parveen (2016) on the use of cautions as a response to rape charges. 
